Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

R. George Bradbury and Althea Bradbury v.
Gordon L. Rasmussen and Y'ora Gene Rasmussen
: Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Arthur H. Nielsen; Attorneys for Appellants;
Dan S. Bushnell; Attorney for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bradbury v. Rasmussen, No. 10055 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4484

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

ocl l \

\9&~
.- A.~,'(

'r..l ' \ .)',(.J"V.

lJ'~"'

\.-•

IN THE SUPREME COURT

£0
STATE OF rirAJI L
ofthe_

1-

~

j\JL 9 ... l96A

__________. . - - - c~·~;t:··ut·~·h
-·- ..... -C\ar"· Supremo

R. GEORGE BRADBURY, Administrator of the Estate of GEORGE
R. BRADBURY, Deceased, and
.\1/l'HEA BRADBURY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents~

vs.

Case No.
10055

GORDON L. RASMUSSEN and
Y'ORA GENE RASMUSSEN,
his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Arthur H. Nielsen
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants
Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dan S. Bushnell
Bushnell and Beesley
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
ST.\TE~l

EXT OF FACTS .................................. 3
.\l{G{r:\li~:XT ............................................................
7
POI:\TT I. THE COlrH.T PROPERLY DETEIL\llXED THAT THERE WAS A CONFlDEXTlAL REL.ATIONSHIP EXISTING
BET\VEEN THE PARTIES AND THEREFOHE THE RESPONDENTS HAD THE
BURDEX OF PROVING TilE FAIRNESS
OF THE THANS.ACTION. .................................. 8
POINT II. TilE COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT AS A RESULT OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP THE
APPELLANTS EXERTED UNDUE INFLl'EXCE lTPON THE RESPONDENTS ... 12
POINT III. T H E MOVING TO THE
FAR~I BY THE APPELLANTS MAY
HA YE BEEN .AN INDUCEMENT FOR
THE REDUCTION OF THE SALE'S
PRICE HUT IT lV AS NOT THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE TRANSACTION. ________ 28
POIXT IY. APPELLANTS WERE NOT
EXTITLED TO r\. JURY TRIAL ................... 30
COXCLlTSION ........................................................ 34
.A.UTHORITIES CITED
CASES
63 A.L.R. 2d 294, Sec. 13 .......................................... 14

23 Am Jur P 790 -······················································· 15
24 American Jurisprudence, Gifts, Sec. 49, P. 7 56
7jj ···········································-······························ 13

1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
24 American Jurisprudence, Gifts, Sec. 116,
Page 791 .............................................................. 13
38 C.J.S. Gifts, Sec. 15, P 790 .................................. 15
Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, et al, 75 Utah
478, 286 p 638 ---················································· 15
Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P 2d 194,
204, 205 ................................................................ I 7
Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, et al, 41 Utah
340, 124, p 765 ···················································· 15
Jardine vs. Archibald, 279 P 2d 454, 3 Utah 2d 88
( 1955) ···································································· 16
Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d, 40,337, P 2d 420 .. 32-33
Jones vs. Cook, 223 P 2d 423, 425, 426, 118 Utah
(1950) 562 .............................................................. 15
Omega Investment Co. vs. Wooley, 72 Utah 424,
271 p 297 ···························································· 33
Petersen vs. Budge, 102 P 211 35 Utah 596 (1909) .. 14
Petty vs. Clark, 102 Utah 186, 129 P 2d 568,
2nd Appeal, 113 Utah 205, 192 P 2d 589 ........ 31
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence 5th Ed. Vol. 3
Sec. 956, P 790, 279 P 2d, 454, 456, Pages
796-98 ······························································ 16-17
2 Pomeroy Equity Juris prudence, Sec. 596 ............ 33
Raleigh v. Wells, 29 Utah, 217, 81 P 908, 910 .... 15 & 16
Spencer vs. Barlow, 319 Mo. 835 5 S.W. 2d 28 ........ 15
Smith, Law of Fraud, Sec. 190 .................................. 15
Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d, 277, 293 P2d, 682 .......... 33
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-21-1 .................. 31, 32
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 38 (b) ...................... 32
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 39 (a) ...................... 31

2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COUBT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
It CEOHGE llRADBCRY, Administrator of the Estate of GEORGE
H. BHA.DBlrltY, Deceased, and
ALTHEA llR.ADBURY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
10055

GORDO~

L. RASMUSSEN and
Y'OlL\ GENE RASMUSSEN,
his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

ST .c\.TE:\IENT OF FACTS
The Staten1ent of Facts contained in the Brief of
Appellants is substantially accurate as far as it goes,
although it tends to highlight the theory of Appellants.
Also, two Findings of Facts are inserted out of context
which again tends to emphasize the position of the Appellants.
3
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Briefly the facts are as follows:
1. The decedent, George R. Bradbury, at the time
of the negotiations was an elderly man in excess of 83

years, with failing eyesight and other disabilities incident to age. Although his deposition was taken and
became part of the evidence in the case he became deceased prior to the trial. Mrs. Bradbury was in excess
of 73 years of age at all times material to the litigation.
2. The discussions, prior to the preparation and

signing of the documents sought to be cancelled in this
action, were always in light of a sale and purchase at the
price of $300.00 per acre for the property.
3. All the terms of the transaction with reference

to the leasing of the farm and paying half the proceeds,
etc., were consistent with the understanding of the parties; the only difference being what the Respondents
thought the documents they had signed was for a Contract of Sale rather than a Deed reserving a Life Estate.
4. The Court found that the deed, lease and transfer of the water stock was null and void and should be
rescinded for the following reasons:

(a) A confidential relationship existed between
the parties thereto.
(b) The plaintiff, Althea Bradbury, and her
husband, George R. Bradbury, deceased, were elderly
people, with infirmities incident to age.
(c) The Defendants represented the transac·
tion as being one for the sale of the farm and water
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stock, when, in fact, the documents purported to make
a gift of said property.
(d) The transferors at no time intended to make
a gift of such property.
(e) The alleged transfer of the above mentioned
property was made subject to a mistake of fact on the
part of Plaintiffs as to the nature of the transaction and
the transfers involved.
(f) The Plaintiffs were of the opinion and understanding that said transactions were for the purpose
of consummating the negotiations for the sale of the
property.
(g) That the transferors did not have the bene-

fit of independent advice in connection with said transaction.
(h) By virtue of the alleged transfers of the
property mentioned above, the transferors had substantially disinherited their natural born heir, being their
only son, R. George Bradbury.
(i) The Defendants failed to prove by clear
and conYincing evidence that the alleged gifts were fair,
equitable~ Yalid and free from any fraud or undue influence arising from the faith and trust reposed in them
because of the confidential relationship. (52-3).
5. The Court stated that the primary issue for de-

termination was whether the Respondents intended a
sale or gift of the property. The Respondents testified

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that they did not understand the true nature of the
transaction as represented by the documents signed by
them, but rather they thought they were signing contracts for the sale of the property to be paid out of
one-half of the proceeds realized from the operation
of the farm. They did not find out the true nature of
the transaction until after a bank appraiser came to the
home for the purpose of examining property reported
to him to be owned by the Appellants.
The argument of the points raised by the Appellants will require further consideration of the evidence
which will show that Mrs. Rasmussen knew she would
not by law receive any inheritance; that she had been
told by the natural heir that if she were left anything
he would fight to take it away; that to implement a predisposition to acquire the farm Mr. Rasmussen quit his
job more than one year prior to the transaction for the
admitted purpose that it would be easier to quit a job
to take over the farm than to terminate a business; that
in the meeting with Mr. Olson the Appellants were the
dominant parties indicating the type of terms which
would be acceptable to them but never mentioning that
the prior discussions had always been in the form of a
negotiated sale; that after the transaction the Appellants were apprehensive of sustaining their position and
scrupulously attempted to fortify the same by issuing
a One Dollar check marked "Paid in Full"; that the
Appellants had the stock certificates transferred with·
out requesting the execution of the certificates them·
selves and the new certificates were issued in the names
6
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ot' the .\ ppellants without any reservation of the life
estate. Further devclop1nent of these facts and other
rdntcd facts. which 1nore than amply sustain the decision of the Trial Court, will be Inade in the argument
hereinafter.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TilE COCHT PROPERLY DETERMINED

THAT TI-IERE \V.AS 1\. CONFIDENTIAL REL.\TIONSI-IIP EXISTING BETWEEN THE
P.\HTIES AND THEREFORE THE RESPOXDEX'l'S 1-I.AD THE BURDEN OF PROV1~(; TilE FAIRNESS OF THE TRANSACTION.
POINT II
TI-IE COCHT PROPERLY CONCLUDED

THAT AS A RESULT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL HEL.A TIONSHIP THE APPELLANTS
EXEHTED LrNDCE INFLUENCE UP 0 N
THE RESPONDENTS.
POINT III
THE ~IOVIXG TO THE FARM BY THE
APPELL.A.NTS :\IAY HA,. . E BEEN AN INDrCE:\IENT FOR THE REDUCTION OF
THE SALES PRICE BUT IT WAS NOT THE
7
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CONSIDERATION F 0 R
TION.

THE TRANSAC-

POINT IV
APPELLANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED
TO A JURY TRIAL.
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT THERE WAS A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN THE
PARTIES AND THEREFORE THE RESPONDENTS HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE FAIRNESS OF THE TRANSACTION.
The Appellants in their Brief on Page 10, after
referring to the determination that there was a "confidential relationship", stated:
"However, the only evidence to sustain this
determination was the fact that the Bradburys
treated Y'Ora Rasmussen as their daughter and
she loved and respected them as her parents."
This statement is grossly inaccurate. In fact, it
is surprising that the contention is now made at all
since in the depositions and in the trial this point was
practically conceded by the Appellants. The evidence
in addition to the fact that the Respondents treated
Y'Ora Rasmussen as their daughter comes from admissions by counsel for the Appellants as well as state-
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ments from the 1\ ppellan ts themselves. Gordon Rasmussen, on two separate occasions in his deposition
udmitted that a relationship of confidence and trust
existed between the parties hereto. He stated:

Q. Do you think they had a confidence and trust
in you1
.A. I an1 sure they did. (Deposition, Page 7).
Q. \Vould you say at this time that you still had
a good close relationship with your in-laws?
A. \T ery good.
Q. \Vould you say at this time that they had no
reason to doubt you in any way; they placed
confidence upon you and your wife?

A. I say that they don't to this day have reason
to haYe any doubt about us, other than just a
family feud that has been bro~ght up by
n1eans that has been previously talked of.
Q. At any rate, the answer to my question, then,
is that you did have a good, close relationship
and that they would rely on what you say and
accept your word for any transaction?
A. They have no reason not to.

Q. Just answer my question directly.
.A. Yes. (Deposition, page 21) .
\Vhen this issue first came up during the trial, Mr.
Xielsen, counsel for the Appellants, stated:
"There is no dispute about the fact that there
was a confidential relationship." (R. 78).
Thereafter counsel attempted to equivocate lrom
the position taken. X evertheless there is more than ade-

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

quate evidence affirming the court's determination that
such a relationship existed and there is no evidence in
the record attempting to rebut such proof.
At the trial Gordon Rasmussen was called by the
Respondents for the specific purpose of testifying concerning such matter. He testified that the Respondents
reposed trust and confidence in him and his wife at
the time of the negotiations and signing of the deed,
one month later when the check for one dollar was
issued, and approximately one year later, which would
cover the time that the water stock certificates were reissued. His testimony was as follows:
A. Now do I understand the question-Do I
feel that the Bradburys had trust and confidence in me?
Q. Right.

A. Yes, they did.
Q. Did the same situation exist, say one month
after the papers were signed?

A. Yes.
Q. Would you say that the situation existed approximately one year after the papers were
signed, or more specifically at or near the
time that the water certificates were transferred?

A. Yes. (R. 190).
Mrs. Bradbury testified concerning this issue as
follows:
10
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Q. Did you at all ti1nes treat Y'Ora as if she was
your natural born daughter 1

A. I sure did.
(~. Did you have a close relationship with her?
.A. \\'ell, just like a mother would. I did everything for her.
(~. Did you have a lot of respect and confidence
in her, and in her husband both?

A. Yes.
(~. I am talking about up to the time when we
had this present difficulty, but up until that
tin1e, did you repose trust and confidence in
the defendants?
A. l sure did. I trusted them.
Q. Did ~ir. Bradbury have the same feelings

toward them?
A. Yes, he trusted them. (R. 7 4).
There is no evidence in the record even attempting
to refute the foregoing testimony. In view of the foregoing it is difficult to comprehend on what basis the
statement is nmde in Appellant's Brief that "the only
eYidence to sustain this determination was the fact that
the Bradburys treated Y'Ora Rasmussen as their
daughter and she loved and respected them as her parents." The balance of the argument submitted by thf
Appellants after such statement consists of quotations
from cases to the effect that the mere relationship of
parent and child does not in and of itself create a presumption of a confidential relationship. Such cases are
11
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completely inapplicable since the evidence reviewed
above shows that there was affirmative evidence showing something more than the relationship of parent and
child to substantiate the determination made by the
Court. In fact the record would sustain a decision that
there had been a stipulation by counsel for the Appellants that a confidential relationship did exist.
The Trial Court expressed no doubt concerning this
issue. In its memorandu1n decision the following statements were made:
... the evidence is clear that during these negotiations between the parties there was a close
confidential relationship. (R. 31).
The defendants in this cause had a close and
confidential relationship with plaintiffs * * * .
(R. 33).
In view of the record there is more than adequate
substantial evidence to support the court's determination. The cases cited by the Appellants are not applicable.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED
THAT AS A RESULT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP THE APPELLANTS
EXERTED UNDUE INFLUENCE UPON
THE RESPONDENTS.
The Appellants in their contention under this point
assume that the Trial Court was required to find specific
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ads and conduct constituting undue influence. Such is

not the law. Rather, the Courts have held that where
u confidential relationship exists the burden shifts to

the donee to show the absolute fairness and validity of
the gift and that it is free from the taint of undue influence. It' the donee fails to sustain that burden of
proof the court is authorized to find that the gift is
void, "through undue influence, without proof of specific nets and conduct of the donee." In 24 American
Jurisprudence, Gifts, Sec. 49, P. 756, 757, it is stated:

* * * It has also been held that if, at the time
of' a gift, the donor's mind was enfeebled by age
and disease, even though not to the extent of producing mental unsoundness, and the donor acted
without independent advice, such gift being of a
large portion of all of the donor's estate and operating substantially to deprive those having the
natural claim to the donor's bounty of all benefit
from the donor's estate, these circumstances, if
proved and unexplained, will authorize a finding
that the gift is void, through undue influence,
!cithout proof of specific acts and conduct of the
donee . . . (Emphasis added).
Again in :24 An1erican Juris prudence, Gifts, Sec.
116, page 791, it is stated:
It has been held that where a confidential relationship exists between the donor and the donee
at the time of the gift, it is generally considered
~o be presun1ptively void, and the burden of proof
Is on the donee to show the absolute fairness and
Yilidity of the gift, and that it is free from the
taint of undue influence. This rule is the same
at law as in equity. * * *
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Moreover, where there is a fiduciary relationship or a relationship of trust and confidence
between a parent and child, then a presumption
arises against the gift.
In an annotation in 63 A.L.R. 2d 294, Sec. 13 entitled Evidence: Burden of Proof; Presumptions, it is
stated:
"It is generally agreed that to establish a gift
of a debt to the debtor, the burden of proof rests
upon the party alleging the fact, and that the
evidence for such purpose must be clear and
convincing. This requirement is especially applicable where the claim is not asserted until
after the death of the creditor. There is no presumption, however, in such case that testimony
of the debtor tending to show a gift is false.
"Where it appears that a confidential relationship existed between the parties, the debtor occupying the dominant or more influential position, the court will scrutinize the evidence with
great care. It has even been held that in such
case a gift of the debt will be presumed, prima
facie, to have been obtained by constructive fraud
on the part of the debtor." (P. 294).
The Utah cases are consistent with the foregoing
general statements of the law. In Petersen vs. Budge,
102 P. 211, 35 Utah 596 (1909), the Court recognized
these well established rules involving gifts to persons
in fiduciary relationships. It stated as follows:
"There is no rule of law more firmly established
than that which holds that transactions between
persons occupying fiduciary o1· confidential relations with each other, in which the stronger or
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superior party obtained an advantage over the
other, cannot be upheld. * * *
"And the rule is well settled that in actions of
this kind, where these confidential relations are
known to exist, the burden of proof is cast upon
the superior party to establish the perfect fairness, adequacy of consideration, and equity of
the transaction."
In Smith, Law of Fraud, Sec. 190, the author says:
"The law is jealous, and public policy sanctions that transactions between persons occupying these relations shall receive the most careful
sc1·utiny, and the burden of proof is shifted so
as to require the beneficiary to establish the validity of bequests, gifts or grant."
In the case of Jones vs. Cook, 223 P2d 423, 118
Utah 562 ( 1950), the Court stated:
"There is no presumption in favor of a gift
inter Yivos. One who asserts title by gift inter
,·ivos has the burden of proving that a gift was
made, including the existence of all of the elements essential to its validity. 23 Am. J ur. P
790; Spencer vs. Barlow, 319 Mo. 835, 5 S.W.
2d 28. The rule is that "a clear and unmistakable
intention on the part of a donor to make a gift
of his property is an essential requisite of a gift
inter Yivos." 38.C.J.S. Gifts, Sec. 15 P 790. This
court held in Christensen v. Ogden State Bank
75 lTtah 478, 286 P 638, and Holman v. Deseret
Savings Bank, et al., 42 Utah 340, 124 P 765,
that proof that decedent intended title to pass
to the claimant during the lifetime of decedent,
must be clear and convincing. In Raleigh v.
\\..ells, 29 Lrtah, 217, 81 P. 908, 910, this court
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also declared that "Courts watch gifts, inter
vivos with caution, especially where, as here, their
enforcement would result in an inequitable distribution of the decedent's property." (223 P
2d 423, 425, 426) .
In Jardine vs. Archibald, 279 P 2d 454, 3 Utah
2d 88 ( 1955) , the court again discussed the rules of
law applicable to cases of this nature. In so doing it
stated as follows:
"However, since the court found as a fact that
a confidential relationship existed between the
decedent and the donees, and since the evidence
clearly sustained such finding, the question of
whether such donees had sustained their burden
of proving lack of fraud or undue influence is
more difficult of solution.
" It is well settled that where a fiduciary or
confidential relationship exists between the donor
and donee, equity raises a presumption against
the validity of such transactions and the burden
is cast upon the donee to prove their validity and
that there was no fraud or undue influence by
proving affirmatively and by clear and convincing evidence compliance with equitable requisites. This is so because there is implied in every
fiduciary or confidential relationship a superiority held by one of the parties over the other. See
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed. Vol.
3 Sec. 956, Page 790, 279 P 2d,. 454, ~56.***
"Of course, among the elements which might
be of great importance, in most cases in determining alleged undue influence where a confidential relationship exists, is whether independent advice had been received by the donor and
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in some instances without such proof the donee
n1ight not be able to sustain hi~ burde!l of proving good faith. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence
5th Ed. Sec. 956 Pages 796-98, states the rule
thus: * * *
The Supreme Court recognized and stated that in
the cases of' this nature the presumption of undue influence inferred fron1 the relationship must be disproven
hy "clear and convincing evidence." In so doing the
court quoted frmn an earlier case as follows:
"In Greener vs. Greener 116 Utah 571, 212
P2d 195, in pages 204, 205, this court speaking
through ~lr. Justice Wolfe in defining what
quandum of proof is needed to be clear and conYincing, said:
" * * * That proof is convincing which carries with it, not only the power to Eersuade the
mind as to the probable truth or- correctness
of the fact it proports to prove, but has the
eleinent of clinching such truth or correctness.
Clear and convincing proof clinches what
might be otherwise probable to the mind.***
"But for a Inatter to be clear and convincing
to a particular mind it must at least have
reached the point where there remains no seriousness or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. * * * "
Fron1 the foregoing authorities it seems abundantly
clear that the burden is not on the Respondents in this
case to show specific acts of undue influence but rather,
once the confidential relationship has been established
the burden shifts to the Appellants to prove by clear
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and convincing evidence the perfect fairness, adequacy
of consideration,and equity of the transaction.
The Court, in this case, however, did not just rely
upon the failure of the Appellants to sustain the burden
of proof that the transaction was fair and equitable.
Rather, the Court, in its Memorendum Decision seemed
impressed with the fact the Appellant had, in fact, exercised undue influence. The Court stated:
"The proof, gathered from n1any sources,
leaves the Chancellor with the fixed feeling that
the Defendants were determined that this property must and would be placed beyond the reach
of R. G. Bradbury, the only heir of Plaintiffs.
There is an unending thread running throughout
the offered proof that a sale of $300.00 per acre
was discussed from tQ.e beginning of these negotiations until the eruption between the parties.

***
''The testimony, and the partial dependence of
Defendants' cause is predicated on the feeling
that Defendants were determined that the end
result of their negotiations with Plaintiffs would
vest in them the title to the premises as against
R. G. Bradbury, the only legal heir." (R. 31-32).
The Court further stated:
"The Defendants in this cause had a close and
confidential relationship with Plaintiffs, prior
to the rupture,-they visited rather frequently.
Y'Ora Rasmussen surely knew that R. G. Bradbury, son of the Plaintiffs, had told her that if
she were left anything by Plaintiffs, he would
fight to defeat it. Moved by this feeling and this
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fear the inference follows that the deed, the
lease and transfer of water stock was sought by
Defendants to circumvent R. G.'s promise so
made. The Defendants and R. G. Bradbury are
well known as the principal actors in this controversy, while the Plaintiffs were non-combatants. This court is not concerned in this cause
with the inside feud." (R. 33}.
The Court then quotes some of the rules of law
cited above.
The Court clearly recognized the issue to be determined. It stated:
"There is no contention of Defendants that
the Plaintiffs made a gift inter vivos or Causa
~lortis, and none can be presumed. The single
issue to be determined is: Did the Plaintiffs intend to convey practically all their property,
some $50 to $60 th,ousand dollars in value, to
the Defendants, and did they intend to disinherit
their own flesh and blood in exchange for a life
estate, a lease and the sum of $1.00?" (R. 33)
Smne of the proof "gathered from many sources"
which left "the Chancellor with a fixed feeling that the
Defendants were determined that the property must
and would be placed beyond the reach of R. G. Bradbury. the only heir of the Plaintiffs," is as follows:
1.

~IOTIVE

1\Irs. Rasmussen testified that she knew she would
not inherit as a legal heir (R. 317), and had been told
by the son of the Plaintiffs that if she were left anything he would take it away from her. (R. 259, 327).
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Mr. Rasmussen testified that he was quite sure that the
son would challenge the rna tter. ( R. 393) .
2. PRIOR DISCUSSIONS WERE ON THE
BASIS OF A SALE AT $300.00 AN ACRE TO

BE PAID OUT OF ONE-HALF OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE OPERATION.
The discussions comn1enced in the fall at the time
of the deer hunt and continued through Thanksgiving,
Christmas, anniversaries in January, and prior to going
to Mr. Tex Olson's office around the First of February.
Mrs. Bradbury testified concerning thee fact that the
offer had been made by a third person to purchase the
farm at $400.00 an acre but that they would be willing
to sell it to the Defendants for $300.00. (R. 75). Mrs.
Rasmussen admitted that there had been such a conversation. (R. 270}.
Mr. Rasmussen testified that a sale at $300.00 an
acre was discussed at the time of the deer hunt ( R. 356),
and on another occasion in his home in Orem. (R.
385-7) . Mrs. Rasmussen, after discussing the various
conversations, admitted that she had testified in her
deposition as follows:
Q. Is it fair to say frmn these conversations that
you and your husband and father and mother
had tentatively come to an agreement of a
value of $300.00 an acre?

A. Yes, I suppose so. (R. 306).
The Court attached to its Memorandum Decision
excerpts of testimony concerning the various discussions
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involving the negotiations for the sale at $300.00 per
tu.·n· and the payment of one-half of the proceeds on
the purchase price. (H. a5-:38). Mrs. Rasmussen further
admitted that she had previously testified in her deposit ion as follows :
Q. \Vhat did you and your husband say about
buying the farm?

A. \Vell, we told then1 that we would buy it if
there was some satisfactory way that it could
be worked out for them and for us both.
to which was added after the taking of the deposition
"So it would be ours when they died." (R. 305). She
further admitted that she had testified in her deposition
concerning the tern1s of payments as follows:
Q. In this meeting was there anything said about
the value per acre again?
A. I think $300.00 an acre was mentioned. But

I am not sure.
Q. \Yas anything said about terms of payment
at that meeting?

A. They were to have half of the profit after
the expenses were paid on the farm.
Q. So th~t, in essence, the contract was going to
be paid out of the proceeds from the farm; is
that right?

A. 'fhat is right. (R. 307).
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3. DISCUSSIONS IN ATTORNEY OLSON'S

OFFICE, DOMINATED BY DEFENDANTS,
STUDIOUSLY ELIMINATED ANY REFERENCE TO PRIOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR A
SALE.
Mr. Rasmussen was the one who called Mr. Olson
and made the appointment and told him that the Bradburys wanted to turn the farm over to the Defendants.
(R. 390). Mr. Rasemussen further stated that in the
discussion he told Mr. Olson that the Bradburys had
offered the Defendants the farm and they needed legal
advice on how it could be arranged so that the farm
would be the Defendants' when the Plaintiffs died.
(R. 359-360). The witness admitted, however, that
there was no mention made to Mr. Olson concerning
a sale at $300.00 an acre. ( R. 388) . Mrs. Rasmussen
likewise testified that the sum of $300.00 was not discussed with Mr. Olson (R. 309-10). Mr. Olson likewise
testified that there was no discussion with him about a
purchase or sale or the price of $300.00 per acre. (R.
402).
4. THE POSITION OF THE APPELLANTS
THAT THEY WERE TO HAVE THE PROPERTY WHEN THE RESPONDENTS DIED,
HOWEVER, WAS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH MR.
OLSON.

The Defendants admitted that they 1nade it clear
and emphasized to Mr. Olson the fact that when the
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Bradbury's died the property would be theirs. (R.
318). Concerning this subject ~Ir. Rasmussen

au.a,,

testified as follows:
Q. Is it fair to say. then, that the things that were
discussed in ~lr. Olson's office was because
you wanted to be protected, is that true?

A. That is true.
Q. "\\' e wanted the property when Mr. and Mrs.

Bradbury died?' '
A. Yes.

Q. And that we would pay 50Cfo from operating
the farm until that time?

A. That was on the life estate.
Q. Right. But during the life estate you would
operate the farm and give them half the proceeds?

A. That is right.
Q. But you did not n1ention that you were purchasing it or intending to purchase it, or that
you would pay a value of $300.00 an acre?

A. No, we didn't. (R. 319).
)lr. Olson was obviously misled since there was
no discussion concerning a sale. He testified that Mr.
Rasmussen explained to him that the Rasmussens would
come and run the farm and that they wanted to be
secure in taking over the farm and "know that the
farm wouldn't go to anyone else after the death of Mr.
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and .1\'Irs. Bradbury." (R. 235). A will was discussed
but it was rejected by the Rasmussens since Mr. Olson
explained that it could be changed. (R. 236). Mr.
Olson further testified that the Ras1nussens were definite
and positive as to the arrangement which they wanted
with reference to their owning the property after the
death of the Bradburys and that the Bradburys were
vague and indefinite as to the mechanics as to how the
matter should be handled. (R. 248). Mr. Olson further
testified that as to the transaction involving the transfer
of the water stock he dealt exclusively with Mr. Rasmussen. ( R. 249) .
5. THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT UNDER-

STAND THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION, BUT RATHER THOUGHT THEY HAD
MADE A SALE.
Both of the Plaintiffs testified that they thought
they were signing a contract for the sale of the farm
at $300.00 an acre to be paid from one-half of the proceeds of the operation of the farm. (R. 85, 213). Both
further testified that Mr. Olson, in reading the documents read them so fast that they couldn't understand
them. (R. 84, 219). Two independent witnesses testified that after the Rasmussens had commenced operating the farm they had a conversation with the Plaintiffs
wherein the statement was made that arrangements
were being made so that the Defendants could buy the
farm. (R. 181, 186, 405).
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TilE SCRUPULOUS CONDUCT OF THE
UE}'ENDANTS .AFTER THE SALE WAS SO
SUPEit-TECIINICAL THAT IT INDICATES
GUILTY .APPREHENSIONS.
6.

When ~lr. Rasmussen first came down to operate
the farm he specifically went to see Mr. Olson to see
thut everything was completed. (R. 391, 393). Approximately one 1nonth after the transaction the Defendants
on their own initiative gave to Mrs. Bradbury a check
for $1.00, on which was the notation "Payment in Full."
At the ti1ne it was given to Mrs. Bradbury, Mr. Rasmussen told her that it was part of our deal, "that went
along with the deal, and that Gordon would be moving
down on the farm, and that it was called for in the contract, and that we wanted to live up to the contract."
(R. 282). llowever, Mrs. Rasmussen didn't call to
her mothe1·'s attention the fact that the notation about
payment in full had been placed on the check. (R. 325).
)Irs. Bradbury testified that she didn't know what the
One Dollar check was payment for and did not notice
that it had a notation thereon regarding the payment
in full. (R. 159) .
~Irs. Rasmussen further testified that the contract

had been read by her three or four or several times.
(R. 329).
The water stock was likewise transferred approximately ten months after the initial transaction upon
the initiative of the Defendants and by use of Assignments rather than requesting the Plaintiffs to endorse
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the certificates themselves. ( R. 210). The new certificates did not reserve the life estate in the Plaintiffs.
(R. 398-9).
7. MRS. RASMUSSEN'S SUBSEQUENT

CONDUCT DEMONSTRATES CHARACTER
CAPABLE OF EXERCISING UNDUE INFLUENCE.
Mrs. Bradbury testified that after the true nature
of the transaction became known to the Plaintiffs she
had a conversation with Mrs. Rasmussen in her kitchen
as follows:
A. And I said, "Y'Ora, there must be some mistake or some misunderstanding about this." I
said, "Let's get together and thresh it out and
see what's the matter," and she just
wouldn't talk about it, and she said, "you get
out of here". She ordered me out of the house
and would not talk to me. (R. 410).
Mrs. Bradbury further testified to a second conversation as follows:
A. I said, "Y'Ora, why did you do such a thing
as that?", and she said, "I am not depriving
my children of \heir needs for R. G.'s children,and I had to secure myself,'' she said.
(R. 412).
The testimony of the Defendants with reference
to various conversations and transactions in essence
amounts to calling her parents liars. Mrs. Bradbury
further testified:
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Q. ~Irs. Bradbury, was Mr. Bradbury ill and

more or less confined to his home during the
last six weeks before he died?

A. Yes.
Q. During that period of time did M~s. Rasmussen come into the house and see hun?
A. Not the six weeks that he was sick.
Q. Did this have any effect upon him?
A. ~Ir. Bradbury, with tears in his eyes, said,
"It does look to me like Y'Ora could come in
and ask how I was.''
Q. During this period of time did you also become confined because of an illness involving
yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. And approximately how long did that last?
A. It was two weeks that I never walked across
the house. * * *
Q. Did Y'Ora help you during that period of
time1
A. No. She never even called. ( R. 408} .
The fact that a confidential relationship existed
between the parties requires the Defendants to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction
was compeltely fair and equitable in all respects. This
the Appellants have failed to do. Rather, the transaction
on its face shows the utter unfairness of the same. The
natural born heir is disinherited and the opportuning
Defendants stand to be the owners of a farm having a
value of approximately $60,000.00 upon which they
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have been living and for which they have paid, according to their testimony, $200.00 from the operation of
the farm. (R. 374}.
The record rather than showing a rebuttal of the
presumption of undue influence arising from the confidential relationship, shows to the contrary deliberate
intentional conduct on the part of the Defendants
amounting to undue influence and a violation of the
confidence and trust reposed in them by the Plaintiffs.
POINT III
THE MOVING TO THE FARM BY THE
APPELLANTS MAY HAVE BEEN AN INDUCEMENT FOR THE REDUCTION O:F
THE SALES PRICE BUT IT WAS NOT THE
CONSIDERATION F 0 R THE TRANSACTION.
The Appellants in their argument of Point III
presuppose that the consideration for the conveying of
the property and water stock was the moving of the
Appellants to the farm. Counsel for the Appellants
then proceed to argue and cite cases to establish that
such consideration would be adequate to support the
transfers. The basic assumption is invalid that the Ap·
pellants moving to the farm was the consideration. The
Court held to the contrary.
The Appellant filed a motion to alter and amend
the Findings of Fact and proposed to the Court that it
adopt the following Finding of Fact:
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(t·) 11hat Defendants gave up their home in

Ore'm, Utah, and moved to Sevier County
and took over the operation of the farm_, all
of which was done in consideration of the
transfer of said property by the Bradburys
to the Defendants in such manner that said
Defendants would have the title to said
property upon the death of the said Bradburys. (Italics added). (R. 45).

The Court agreed to have inserted in the amended
Findings of Fad the part of the above quotation which
has been italicized. The balance of the quotation was
rejected by the Court.
There is no question but what the Respondents
naturally desh·ed to have the companionship of the Appellants and their children. Such desires could only be
considered under the facts of this case to be the inducement for the transaction at a reduced price and not the
negotiated and bargained for consideration. As cited
above, conversations we1·e related wherein the Respondents stated that they had an opportunity to sell the
farm for $400.00 an acre but would be willing to sell
it to the Appellants for $300.00 an acre. (R. 75, 270).
The Appellants cite no evidence to support a contention that moving to the farm was the consideration
for the conYeyance of the property and the water certificates. Rather, they merely quote the findings of the
Court which merely recites the fact that the Respondents desired to have the association with the Appellants
and that the Appellants did move to Sevier County. It
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is not logical or reasonable to then draw the inference
that this conduct was the consideration for the transacton. As demonstrated above, the Court specifically
and expressly rejected such a contention. The evidence
reviewed above clearly demonstrates that all of the
discussions and negotiations were on the basis of a
sale at $300.00 per acre. The payment of this amount
was to be the consideration for the transaction.
As to the Appellants quitting good jobs, etc., the
testimony is that Mr. Rasmussen was having trouble
with his feet in working on the concrete and had already
terminated his business. (R. 75, 212, 321). Mrs. Rasmussen testified that she was working in Richfield and
making about the same as she did in Provo. (R. 330).
Again the cases cited by the Appellants are inap·
plicable. The issue is not whether promises to move to
the farm and take care of the elderly people is sufficient or adequate consideration to support a contract
but rather there must first be a finding or some evidence
that such a promise was made as consideration for a
change of position. The Appellants have cited no evidence to support their contention. The evidence re·
viewed with reference to other points definitely refutes
such a contention. Cases may hold that such a change
of position can be adequate consideration but they must
be based upon a different factual basis than the one
presented in this case.
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POINT IV
APPELLANTS \\'ERE NOT ENTITLED
'l'O A JURY TRIAL.
It has been traditional in the State of Utah that
the conunon law distinction between equity and law
cases was retained with reference to the right to trial
by jut·y. If the case is one in equity there is no right
to a jury trial as a matter of right. The question as to
whether an action is legal or equitable is discussed in
some length in Petty vs. Clark, 102 Utah 186, 129 P 2d
568, 2nd Appeal, 113, Utah, 205, 192 P 2d 589.

Rule 39 (a) U.R.C.P. cited by the Appellants does
not involve the basic right of jury trial but rather discusses the mechanics of designating upon the register
of action those cases where a trial by jury has been
demanded presuming that it was a proper case for a
jury trial in the first instance. The Appellants then
cite Section 78-21-1 U.C.A. 1953 as being applicable,
apparently contending that this is an action for the
recovery of specific real or personal property. To the
contrary, this is clearly a case to cancel, rescind and
annul a deed, a lease and a transfer of water certificates.
This is the very relief granted by the Court. The Appellants as a first paradox rely on the fact that this
was an equity case in citing to the Court on page 16
of their Brief authority to the effect that on an appeal
in an equity case the review may be both as to law and
fact. The second paradox is that the former attorney
for the Respondents requested a jury trial and the
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counsel for Appellants objected to the same, maintaining that the Respondents were not entitled to a trial on
the issues by the jury under the provisions of Sec. 7821-1 U.C.A. 1953. At the Pre-Trial present counsel
for Respondents admitted the case was an equity case
and that the objection was well taken. At that time
Counsel for the Appellants then reversed his position
and indicated that he desired a jury trial. In the Appelpellant's Brief mention is made of the Pre-Trial proceedings although no record was made of the same. Also,
the original of Appellant's objection to the demand for
jury trial is not in the record and therefore has not
been certified to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, on
the 15th day of March, 1962, under the signature of
counsel for the Appellants the objection to the demand
for jury trial was served upon John T. Vernieu and
recited as follows:
Defendants hereby object to the demand for
jury trial filed herein by the plaintiffs upon the
following grounds and for the following reasons:
1. Plaintiffs are not entitled to trial of the
issues by a jury under the provisions of Sec.
78-21-1 U.C.A. 1953.
2. Timely demand for a jury trial was not
made, as required by the provisions of Rule 38
(b) U.R.C.P.
The separate opinion in the case of Johnson vs.
Johnson, 9 Utah 2d, 40, 337 P 2d 420, cited by the
Appellants, would seem to indicate that an action to
rescind conveyances of real property permits a jury
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trial under Sec. 78-21-1 U.C.A. However, the main
opinion under the case holds to the contrary. The case
is very analogous to the present case. It involved an
action to cancel and rescind conveyances of real estate
procured hy a son from a father where a confidential
rdationship existed. The Court in the Johnson case~
stated:
"In assaying the sufficiency of the proof, the
Plaintiff here has significant help in the rule
that where a confidential relationship is shown to
exist and a gift or conveyance is made to a party
in a superior position, a presumption arises that
the transaction is unfair. 1 The presumption has
the form of eYidence and will itself support a
finding if not overcome by countervailing evidence. Therefore the burden was on the defendant, Calvin Johnson, to convince the Court by a
preponderance of the evidence that the transaction was fair. 2 If he failed to do so, the finding
to the contrary was justified,and it will not be
disturbed on appeal unless the contrary evidence
was so clear and persuasive that all reasonable
minds would so find." (337 P. 2d 420, 442.)
The Court further stated:
"The trial Court properly regarded the proceedings as in essence an action in equity to declare Yoid instruments by which Calvin Johnson
proported to obtain his father's property. * * *
Due to the nature of the action it was within
the prerogative of the Court to refuse a request
for a jury!" (337 P.2d, 420, 424).
Omega Investment Company vs. Wooley, 72 Utah 424 271 p
797, quoting 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 596.'
a In re Swan's Estate. 4 Utah 2d, 277, 293 P 2d, 682.

1
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Prior to the Pre-Trial the Appellants contended
that this was an equity case. In their Brief on appeal
before this Court they are still maintaining that this
is an equity case. The Johnson case cited by the Appellants holds that a suit to rescind and cancel written
documents is an equity case and that the trial court
properly deny a jury trial in such a case.
CONCLUSION
The Appellants prior to the trial and at the time
of the trial did not contest but in fact stipulated at one
point that a confidential relationship existed. There was
no evidence introduced to refute or rebut such a deter·
mination of the Trial Court. A confidential relationship
having been established, the Court properly concluded
that the Appellants had exerted undue influence. This
finding may be supported either upon a failure of the
Appellants to rebut the presumption, or by actual
specific evidence to the effect that the Appellants speci·
fically took advantage of the confidence and trust re·
posed in them.
The other findings of the Court in addition to the
determination of undue influence equally support the
judgment declaring the transfers to be null and void.
More particularly, they establish that there was no in·
tent to make a gift; that the transaction was misrepre·
sen ted; and that there was a mistake of fact on the
part of the Respondents, knowledge of which was in
the possession of the Appellants.
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The A ppellan ls erroneously suggest that the consideration for the transaction was their moving to Sevier
County, which is contrary to the specific action of the
Court rejecting such contention.
Finally, the Appellants should not be permitted
to inconsistently object to a demand for jury trial prior
to the trial of the matter urging that the case is an
equity case and to also urge that the case be reviewed
ns an equity case and then in a complete reversal maintain to this Court that they were erroneously denied the
right to a jury trial.
The Trial Cnurt studiously reviewed this case after
the trial and has written a Memorandum Decision supported by excerpts of testimony. That Memorandum
Decision dearly shows that there was no doubt in the
Trial Court's mind concerning its decision on the issues
in this case. Either under an equity review or the review
of legal issues there is more than sufficient substantial
evidence to sustain the Trial Court's determination.
Respectfully submitted,
Dan S. Bushnell
Bushnell & Beesley
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
15 East 4th South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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